



## **NEXUS BETWEEN DEMOCRATISATION AND INCOME IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

**Ibrahim Mohammed**

Department of Economics, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua University, Katsina

[Ibrahim.mohammed@umyu.edu.ng](mailto:Ibrahim.mohammed@umyu.edu.ng)

+2347067712311

**Muaz Muhammad Lawal**

Department of Economics, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua University, Katsina

[muaz.muhammad@umyu.edu.ng](mailto:muaz.muhammad@umyu.edu.ng)


+2348034890899

### **ABSTRACT**

The study examined the impact of democratization on per capita income in 27 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 2000-2022. We use dichotomous and continuous measures of democratization to capture both the impact of democratic transitions and gradual changes of democratization respectively. The methodology involves two complementary estimation techniques for robust findings. First, we exploit Propensity Score Matching to estimate the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) for the dichotomous nature of democratic transition. Second, we estimate fixed-effect model to control for endogeneity from time-invariant characteristics. Findings suggest that countries in the SSA that transitioned from undemocratic to democratic regimes, have income per capita that is on average, 5-6% (or 928 USD) higher than they would have had if they had remained undemocratic., with the impact rising higher when measured against the treatment effect model. Additionally, a one-unit increase in the participatory democracy index is leads to 25.3% increase in the Real GDP per capita. These findings provide empirical evidence that democracy- both as discrete transition and gradual improvements- promotes economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Keywords:** Democratization, Growth, Fixed effects, Africa.

**JEL Classification:** E31, I32, H53



## 1. Introduction

One of the questions that have generated much debate in political and institutional economics is whether democracy promotes economic growth and development. While a large literature finds that democracy is associated with higher income levels in the long run (Acemoglu et al., 2019; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2015; Madsen 2015; Acemoglu, 2008), evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa remains mixed and often inconclusive (Bates, Fayad & Hoeffler 2012; Masaki and van de Walle, 2014). Additionally, as Boese-Schlosser & Eberhardt, (2023) posit that one of the major challenges of unravelling how democracy causes economic growth is the underlying political and economic institutions that shape democracy-growth relationship.

Again, as Acemoglu (2019) noted that the impressive growth witnessed in some no democracies like China in the recent years, has further popularized the view that democratic institutions are not relevant or “at worst a hindrance for economic growth”. In Sub-Saharan Africa specifically, the recent spate of military coups in such countries like Niger, Gabo, Mali and Burkina Faso, which may reflect the dissatisfaction with the civilian governments as noted by Basedau (2023), make a revisit to the democracy-growth nexus in the region timely and important, in both academia and public discourse.

Theoretically, Democracy is expected to lead to high income through various channels. Importantly, democratic political institutions strengthen property rights by imposing checks on predatory rulers, lowering expropriation risk and improving redistributive taxation (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005). More secure property rights, in turn, encourage investment, reduce risk premia, and ultimately raise income levels (Acemoglu, 2009; Besley & Ghatak, 2010).

We use annual panel data for up to 27 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 2000-2022 to revisit the relationship. Democratisation is measured both as a dichotomous transition from autocracy to democracy and, for robustness, as a continuous index of democratic quality. Our property rights security is a more recent data from Fraser Institute. Our outcome of interest is GDP



# FUDMA ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW (FEDER)

Vol. 9 Issue 1, June, 2026 | ISSN: 2616-0846



per capita in constant US dollars (level, not growth rate), which allows us to estimate the cumulative income effect of regime type and its institutional mediator.

We employ both treatment effects by propensity-score matching and fixed-effects models specifications, to measure the level change in democratization and the subtle changes controlling for time-invariant characteristics of the countries, respectively. Previous studies like Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson (2019) and Boese-Schlösser & Eberhardt, (2023) that examined the impact of democratisation using similar methodological mix were carried out on larger sets of countries. By testing the relationship in Sub-Saharan African setting, this study contributes to both the democracy-growth debate and the broader literature on institutions as fundamental causes of prosperity.

## 2. Recent Empirical Literature Review


The relationship between democratisation and economic development has been empirically investigated in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and across other regions. While earlier studies (e.g., Przeworski et al., 2000, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and Knutsen(2012,) often arrived at inconclusive evidence or reverse causality, recent works have largely established positive impact of democratisation on economic growth and development, (e.g. Heshmati & Kim, (2017; Boese-Schlösser & Eberhardt 2023). In his review of recent literature, Fadoua (2021) surveyed many empirical works and conclude the common round for most them is that the nature of political powers influences economic growth. Such recent works usually employed large panel data to examine the direct effect, causal mechanism and institutional mediation. Using different methodological approach.

Recent studies support the positive impact of democratisation on per capita GDP in a panel of countries. Uslu (2022) posits that democracy has positive impact on economic growth most especially when factors like military coups are controlled for. Similarly in a lager panel of over 100 countries Heshmati & Kim, (2017) examined the democracy-growth relationship. Evidence showed positive impact of democracy on economic growth on both static and dynamic production



# FUDMA ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW (FEDER)

Vol. 9 Issue 1, June, 2026 | ISSN: 2616-0846



models. Earlier study by Gründler and Krieger (2016) has ascribed the growth effect of democracy to accelerated investment in both human capital and physical capital

Boese-Schlösser & Eberhardt, (2023) investigated the underlying institutional mechanisms which drive the relationship between democracy and economic growth by employing different measures of democracy. Testing heterogeneous treatment effect model, the study found that institutional variables like constraints on the executive and electoral system are the foundational factors for growth and development. Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson (2019) examined the impact of democratisation on per capita GDP in a panel of counties over long time series data, and using both parametric and semi parametric estimation techniques. They found robust evidence that democracy has positive impact on economic growth.

Masaki and Va de Walle (2014) estimate the impact of democratization in 43 Sub-Saharan African countries. They found evidence that democracy has positive relationship with economic growth, most especially in countries that sustained democracy for long period of time. Their findings align with much later work by Doces (2020) who found that democracy Granger-causes economic growth through reduced government consumption and improved human capital


However, not all studies were able to confirm positive impact as study by Khodaverdian (2022) concluded that democracy has no significant impact on per capita GDP in African countries. In different context, Rachdi & Saidi (2014) investigating the effect of democracy on economic growth has found robust evidence of negative relationship in some MENA countries. Fadoua (2021) also in a review paper pointed out several works that established negative relationship between democracy and economic growth.

There is also a growing strand of empirical works examines mediation, addressing the issue of how democracy translates into growth. Early on, in their analysis of the “Reversal of Fortune” Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2005) have keenly demonstrated how economic institutions, (property rights to be specific) emerge due to the conflicting interest of the political powers, over the distribution of resources in the political institutions. In an extension to that Acemoglu (2009)



# FUDMA ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW (FEDER)

Vol. 9 Issue 1, June, 2026 | ISSN: 2616-0846



noted that political institutions like the form of government (democratic or nondemocratic), the degree of constraints on the political elites and the electoral system, determine the collective decisions in a society that ultimately shape the economic institutions. In a recent empirical works, Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson (2019) found that important mechanism through which democracy influence economic growth include; growth-enhancing economic reforms, tax system, trade openness, investment on education and social stability. Martinez-Bravo & Wantchekon (2021) conducted a survey of literature on political distortions, institutional reforms, and the way they affect economic outcomes. The study concluded that institutional reforms and electoral incentives can promote secure property rights and better redistribution.

### 3. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundation of this study rests on the Median-Voter Theory. A particularly powerful micro-foundation for why democratisation should improve economic growth and development, most particularly through property-rights security, especially in low- and middle-income settings like Sub-Saharan Africa- comes from median-voter theorem as applied to political transitions (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2009; Ansell and Samuels, 2014). In most autocracies, political power is heavily concentrated among a narrow elite that controls the state apparatus and often owns a disproportionate share of productive assets (land, mines, and state contracts). The median voter, by contrast, typically possesses modest physical and human capital but little political influence. Because the elite fear redistribution more than they value broad-based growth, they prefer weak property-rights enforcement that allows selective expropriation of non-elite assets while protecting their own privileged holdings (Boix, 2003; Albertus and Menaldo, 2018). Democratisation dramatically shifts this equilibrium by extending suffrage and political voice to the median voter. Once enfranchised, the new median voter has strong incentives to demand.



## 4. Methodology

### 4.1 Data Sources and Measurement of Variables

The study used annual balanced panel data for 27 Sub-Saharan African countries, between 2000 and 2022 (see Appendix: I). The choice of the countries in sample and the time frame was strictly due to data availability. Our first measure of democratization follows Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo & Robinson (2019) with modification. It is a binary measure which comes from Freedom House Freedom in the World (FIW) publication. A country is democratic and coded “1” if it is classified as “Politically free” or “partially free” by Freedom House and undemocratic, coded 0 if it is classified as “Not free” (FIW, 2024). The alternative measure is Participatory Democracy Index from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) institute which assess the extent to which citizens participate in political decision making beyond voting (V-Dem, 2025). Other variables used such as per capita income, Gross fixed capital Formation, GDP deflator, primary school enrolment, and trade openness are sourced from World Development Indicator of the World bank (2024).

### 4.2 Estimation Technique

This study combines two complementary techniques to estimate the total effect of democratisation on income per capita. First, we exploit the dichotomous nature of democratic transitions by estimating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) using propensity-score matching (PSM). This approach is by matching democratising country-years to non-democratising country-years with similar pre-treatment characteristics, thereby reducing selection bias arising from observable confounders. Second, we estimate fixed-effects model on the full unbalanced panel. This specification absorbs all time-invariant country heterogeneity while allowing us to include time-varying controls and quantify the direct effect.

### 4.3 Model Specification

#### I. Treatment Effect Model

The first line of estimation is the semi parametric model that do not rely on the linearity assumption. We estimate a treatment effect models by propensity score matching (PSM). Our subjects are the individual countries/ years and the outcomes variables are; Per capita income. We model the propensity score (unweighted) using probit model, which shows the outcomes variables at time  $t$  for a country changing to either democratic or non-democratic ( $\emptyset$ ) at time  $t$ ; where  $D \in \{0, 1\}$ . We also incorporate covariates. The separate estimates for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is presented in table 3 below.

## II. Panel Fixed-Effects Mediation Models

We then estimate three linear panel model with year fixed effects ( $\lambda_i$ ):

The general FE model can be specified as;

$$y_{it} = X'_{it} \beta + \alpha_i + \lambda + \varepsilon_{it} \dots \dots \dots (i)$$

Where  $y$  denotes the dependent variable,  $X$  consists of set of independent variables. The  $\alpha_i$  represents a set of individual fixed effects, which control the impact of any time-invariant individual characteristics. Lastly, the  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is an error term. Which include all other time-varying unobservable variables.

Empirically, to determine the impact of democratization on income per capita, we estimate two models controlling for different variables as follows;

**Model 1:**  $PC_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 D_{it} + X'_{it} \beta + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it} \dots \dots \dots (ii)$

**Model 1:**  $PC_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 DEM_{it} + X'_{it} \beta + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it} \dots \dots \dots (ii)$

In model 1 we estimate the effects of democratization on economic growth, where  $D$  represents dichotomous measure of democracy along other covariates. In model 2 we estimate the effects of democratization on economic growth, where  $DEM$  represents continuous measure of democracy along other covariates.

## 5. Results and Discussion

### I. Summary Statistics

We compute descriptive statistics of the variables as measured and used in various models, for the entire sample and for three categories in the 27 countries (see Appendix I). The first category is countries that are Democratic for the entire sample period, that is, countries coded 1 throughout, according to the measure. The second categories are those countries that are non-democratic throughout (i.e. takes 0 wholly). The final categories we termed reversals are countries with shades of democracies and non-democracies in different years (i.e. 0/1).

**Table 1:** Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

|                                       | Full Sample          | Persistent Democracies | Persistent non-democracies | Reversal Countries (0/1) |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Variables</b>                      | <b>Mean (Sd)</b>     | <b>Mean (Sd)</b>       | <b>Mean (Sd)</b>           | <b>Mean (Sd)</b>         |
| Democracy (Dichotamous 0/1)           | <b>0.69</b> (0.46)   | <b>1</b> (0)           | <b>0</b> (0)               | <b>0.62</b> (0.49)       |
| Participatory Democracy Index (0-1)   | <b>0.28</b> (0.113)  | <b>0.38</b> (0.08)     | <b>0.17</b> (0.04)         | <b>0.23</b> (0.07)       |
| Real per capita income (US \$)        | <b>1896</b> (2361)   | <b>2643</b> (2758)     | <b>746.8</b> (429)         | <b>1498</b> (2025)       |
| Investment/GFCF (% GDP)               | <b>20.66</b> (8.48)  | <b>22.03</b> (7.18)    | <b>20.99</b> (7.54)        | <b>19.04</b> (9.78)      |
| Trade openness (Trade%GDP)            | <b>61.51</b> (25.17) | <b>64.18</b> (26.0)    | <b>57.18</b> (20.12)       | <b>60.17</b> (25.62)     |
| Primary School enrolment (% of Gross) | <b>96.46</b> (27.44) | <b>97.54</b> (25.0)    | <b>99.02</b> (27.71)       | <b>94.34</b> (29.70)     |
| Observation (Country-year)            | <b>621</b>           | <b>276</b>             | <b>92</b>                  | <b>253</b>               |
| Number of Countries                   | 27                   | 12                     | 4                          | 11                       |

From table 2 in the full sample, the SSA countries have on average 0.28 participatory democracy index. the score is low considering their respective scales. However, comparatively, it's evident that democratic countries are richer than non-democracies, as expected. Countries with mix of democratic and nondemocratic regimes over the years are still far better than no democracies. In all cases the standard deviations are quite small, pointing to the fact that countries are uniformly with such low scores.

Furthermore, full sample average for real per capita income (\$1,896) has a large standard deviation indicating the existent income disparities across SSA countries. Persistent democracies also have in come that is on average that is 154% higher than the non-democracies.

## II. Treatment effect Estimation

**Table 2:** Treatment Effect estimation for democratization on Per capita Income

|                                             | Coefficient | AI robust std error | z-statistic |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 1.Effect of Democratisation→PC (US\$)       | 927.931***  | 161.6498            | 5.74        |
| <i>No. of observation:</i> 621              |             |                     |             |
| <i>Estimator:</i> Propensity Score Matching |             |                     |             |
| <i>Treatment models:</i> Probit             |             |                     |             |

Note: covariates use; INV, OPEN, INF, ENROL

In table 2 we estimated the total effect of democratization on the level of GDP per capita in current US dollar. The result show that sampled countries in the SSA that transitioned from undemocratic to democratic, have income per capita (PC) that is on average, 928 USD higher than they would have had if they had remained undemocratic. That is after matching them to comparable undemocratic countries. This provides the first line of evidence that democratization improve income in the SSA countries.

## III. Panel Regression with Fixed Effect Model

| Independent Variables | Per capita Income                  |                                            |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|                       | Model 1<br>(Freedom House Measure) | Model 2<br>(Democracy Participatory Index) |
| <i>lnDEM</i>          |                                    | 0.253**<br>(0.1208)                        |
| <i>D(0/1)</i>         | 0.054*<br>(0.0279)                 |                                            |
| <i>LnINV</i>          | 0.164***<br>(0.0462)               | 0.157**<br>(0.0572)                        |
| <i>lnOPEN</i>         | -0.111*<br>(0.0616)                | -0.135**<br>(0.0541)                       |
| <i>LnINF</i>          | 0.468***<br>(0.1304)               | 0.462***<br>(0.1243)                       |
| <i>lnENROL</i>        | 0.421***<br>(0.1291)               | 0.392***<br>(0.1281)                       |

|                          |                      |                      |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Constant</i>          | 2.962***<br>(0.6761) | 3.586***<br>(0.4932) |
| <i>No of observation</i> | 621                  | 621                  |
| <i>F statistic</i>       | (5, 22) =131.08      | F(5, 22) = 102.15    |
| <i>Prob&gt;F</i>         | 0.0000               | 0.0000               |
| <i>Within R squared</i>  | 0.5466               | 0.5582               |

Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis

\*\*\* $P < 0.01$ , \*\* $P < 0.05$  and \* $P < 0.10$ .

Main results from table 3 indicate that in model I, where democracy is measured on dichotomous scale (using data from Freedom House) a democratic regime is associated with 5.4% higher GDP per capita as the coefficient is positive and significant. Investment (INV), trade and School enrolment (ENROL) also have positive and significant effects on per capita income, as expected. On the other hand, openness (OPEN) shows negative and significant impact on per capita income. In Model 2, the result is also consistent when we measure democratisation using the V-Dem Participatory Democracy Index, which is continuous measure (0-1). A one unit increase in the participatory democracy index is leads to 25.3% increase in the Real GDP per capita. Similarly, Investment (INV), and School enrolment (ENROL) also have positive and significant effects on per capita income, as expected. On the other hand, trade openness (OPEN) shows negative and significant impact on per capita. Inflation rate (INF) shows positive impact on per capita income also.

Taken together, the two specifications provide a consistent result, that is, both discrete democratic transitions and gradual democratic deepening lead to substantial income gains in Sub-Saharan Africa These findings are robust to the time-invariant characteristics and the time-varying control variables used in various models.

## 6. Conclusion

The study examined the Democracy-income nexus in 27 countries, in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is achieved by employing both treatment effects by propensity-score matching and fixed-effects



# FUDMA ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW (FEDER)

Vol. 9 Issue 1, June, 2026 | ISSN: 2616-0846



models specifications, to measure the level change in democratization and the subtle changes controlling for time-invariant characteristics of the countries, respectively.

The study therefore demonstrates that democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa is associated with economically significant and persistent income gains. Countries that sustain democratic institutions have GDP per capita that is approximately 5–6% higher than comparable non-democratic regimes, with the impact rising higher when measured against the semi-parametric way that is, estimated by propensity-score matching. Both discrete democratic transitions and gradual improvements in democratic quality deliver appear to improve income levels.

Theoretically, the study validates the propositions that democracy is expected to lead to high income through various channels. Importantly, democratic political institutions strengthen property rights by imposing checks on predatory rulers, lowering expropriation risk and improving redistributive taxation.

In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa specifically, where the recent spate of military coups in such countries like Niger, Gabon, Mali and Burkina Faso- which may reflect the dissatisfaction with the civilian governments, the study is therefore a revisit to the significance of democracy to economic growth in the region timely and important, in both academia and public discourse.

## Reference

- Acemoglu, D. Naidu, S. Restrepo, P. and Robinson, J.A. (2019). Democracy Does Cause growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(1):47–100
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A., (2005). *Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth*. Handbook of Economic Growth. Volume 1, Elsevier B.V.
- Acemoglu, D. (2008). *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Albertus, M. and Menaldo, V. (2018) *Authoritarianism and the elite origins of democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Basedau, M. (2023). Coup in Africa: Why they Happen and What can (Not) be Done About it. Blog article <http://www.megatrends-afrika.de/publikation/mta-joint-futures-05-coups-in-africa>
- Bates, R.H., Fayad, G. and Hoeffler A. (2012). The State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Growth Center *Working paper*. S-2013-NOC-1



# FUDMA ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW (FEDER)

Vol. 9 Issue 1, June, 2026 | ISSN: 2616-0846



- Besley, T. and Ghatak, M., (2010). *Property Rights and Economic Development*. Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. (5,) Elsevier.
- Boese-Schlosser, V.A. and Eberhardt, M. (2023) How Does Democracy Cause Growth? Discussion Paper SP V 2023-501 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
- Boese, V.A and Eberhardt, M. (2021) Democracy Doesn't Always Happen Over Night: Regime Change in Stages and Economic Growth. V-Dem Working Paper, University of Gothenburg.
- Doces, J.A. (2020). Democracy, Consumption and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. *International Area Studies Review* Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of foreign Studies, vol 23(1) 28-48. DOI: 10.1177/2233865919871702
- Fadoua, M. (2021). The role of democracy in economic growth: a (brief) literature review. *African Scientific Journal* ISSN: 2658-9311 Vol (3):7
- Freedom in the World (FIW)(2024). All data (2013-2024)  
[http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/All\\_data\\_FIW\\_2013-2024.xlsx](http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/All_data_FIW_2013-2024.xlsx)
- Galiani, Sebastian and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2010) Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling, *Journal of Public Economics* 94, 700–729
- Heshmati A. and Kim, N. S. (2017). The Relationship between Economic Growth and Democracy: Alternative Representations of Technological Change. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics. Discussion paper. IZA DP No. 10880
- Khodaverdian, S. (2022). The African tragedy: The effect of democracy on economic growth. *Empirical Econ* (62): 1147–1175.
- Knutsen, C.H., (2011). Which democracies prosper? Electoral rules, form of government and economic growth, *Electoral Studies* (30)83–90
- Knutsen, C.H. (2012). Democracy and economic growth: A survey of arguments and results. *International Area Studies Review*. DOI: 10.1177/2233865912455268
- Madsen, J.A. Raschky, P.A. and Skali (2015). Does democracy drive income in the world, 1500–2000? *European Economic Review*, 78:175–195, 2015.
- Martinez-Bravo, M. And Wantchekon, L. (2021). Political Economy and Structural Transformation: Democracy, Regulation and Public Investment. Centro De Estudios Monetarios Y. Financie Ros (CEMFI) *Working Paper* 2110
- Masaki, T. and Nicolas van de Walle, N. (2014). World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) *Working Paper* 2014/057
- Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G., (2008). Democratization and growth, *The Economic Journal* (118) 1520–1551
- Rachdi, H. Saidi H. (2004). Democracy and Economic Growth: Evidence in MENA countries. *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences* (191) 616 – 621
- Tavares, J., & Wacziarg, R. (2001). How democracy affects growth. *European economic review*, 45(8), 1341-1378.
- Toulmin, C., (2006). Securing Land and Property Rights in Africa: Improving the Investment Climate. *Global Competitiveness Report*, World Economic Forum Switzerland.



# FUDMA ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW (FEDER)

Vol. 9 Issue 1, June, 2026 | ISSN: 2616-0846



Przeworski, A. Maichael, E. A., Antonio, J.C. and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World. (1950-1990) *Cambridge University Press*

Uslu, H. (2022). Democracy and Economic Growth. Institution of Economic Development and Social Researches Publications, Turkey

## Appendix:

### Appendix I: Countries in Sample

| Country                  | Code | Categorization              |
|--------------------------|------|-----------------------------|
| Benin                    | BEN  | Persistent democracies      |
| Burundi                  | BDI  | Reversal                    |
| Botswana                 | BWA  | Persistent democracies      |
| Central African Republic | CAF  | Reversal                    |
| Cote d'Ivoire            | CIV  | Reversal                    |
| Cameroon                 | CMR  | Persistence non-democracies |
| Chad                     | TCD  | Persistence non-democracies |
| Congo, Republic          | COG  | Persistence non-democracies |
| Gabon                    | GAB  | Reversal                    |
| Ghana                    | GHA  | Persistent democracies      |
| Guinea-Bissau            | GNB  | Reversal                    |
| Kenya                    | KEN  | Persistent democracies      |
| Madagascar               | MDG  | Reversal                    |
| Mali                     | MLI  | Reversal                    |
| Mauritius                | MUS  | Persistent democracies      |
| Namibia                  | NAM  | Persistent democracies      |
| Niger                    | NER  | Persistent democracies      |
| Nigeria                  | NGA  | Persistent democracies      |
| Rwanda                   | RWA  | Persistence non-democracies |
| Senegal                  | SEN  | Persistent democracies      |
| Sierra Leone             | SLE  | Persistent democracies      |
| Togo                     | TGO  | Persistent democracies      |
| Tanzania                 | TZA  | Reversal                    |
| Uganda                   | UGA  | Reversal                    |
| South Africa             | ZAF  | Persistent democracies      |
| Congo, Dem. Rep.         | ZAR  | Reversal                    |
| Zimbabwe                 | ZWE  |                             |